

EXPLICATION OF THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN AGE IN HEIDEGGER'S SECONDARY LITERATURE

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In this work, and in line with the attention international researchers have devoted to Heidegger's major works to contribute to the elucidation of his teachings, we intend to establish a hypothesis based on Heidegger's secondary literature in his thought—following his speeches, presentations, lectures, letters, notes, interviews, etc. Thus, the hypothesis of this work aims to prove the foundation of Heidegger's teachings on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age—specifically, by posing questions on the Essence of Modern Age Science, the Essence of Action in the Modern Age, and the Essence of Technic in the Modern Age. In this context, this essay explores the main phenomena of modernity emphasized by Heidegger in his secondary works to demonstrate the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age and thereby prove the Metaphysical Foundation of the Modern Age's essence of Modern Age science, the essence of action in the Modern Age, and the essence of technic in the Modern Age. The ultimate goal is to synthesize fragments from various Heideggerian works of secondary literature to point out, in one place, what Heidegger taught at a higher level in his major works: how the Modern Age, in all its fundamental phenomena and in the entirety of its richness/deficiencies, delivers its foundations within Modern Age Metaphysics.

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Question of the Essence of the Modern Age Science

In his 1938 lecture entitled *The Age of the World Picture* (Die Zeit des Weltbildes), Heidegger delves into the metaphysical foundations of the Modern Age. This becomes evident right from the beginning of the lecture, as Heidegger, for instance, states: “Metaphysics establishes an epoch by providing a specific interpretation of Seiende and a particular understanding of truth as the foundation of the epoch in its essential form. This foundation permeates all manifestations characterizing the epoch” (Heidegger 1977a: 75). Such a thing is not surprising because, for example, in a text he composed in 1940 titled *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* (Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit), following the Freiburg lecture from 1930 titled *On the Essence of Truth* (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit), Heidegger explicitly states: “The story told in the Allegory of the Cave provides an image of what is happening now and what will happen in the future in the history of Western humanity (...)” (Heidegger 1976a: 237). This is particularly significant in this context, given that Heidegger in many places in his work explicitly refers to metaphysics as Platonism and hold that metaphysics is what grounds epochs by permeating all phenomena of that epoch¹. However, Platonism is like a dome covering the history of Western humanity, under which metaphysical shifts occur as changes of epochs based on metaphysical teachings. Thus, seeking to arrive at the metaphysical foundation of the Modern Age through the characteristics of the Modern Age, Heidegger states that we can include modern science as the first appearance of the Modern Age, then, machine technic as a visible manifestation of Modern Age technic, the entry of art into aesthetics in a way that the work of art in the Modern Age is taken as an object of experience, the overall human activity understood and realized as culture, and finally, secularization (Cf. Heidegger 1977b: 75–76).

Heidegger contends that, due to all the previously enumerated factors, there is a pressing need to confront the first factor: gaining access to the essence of modern science – as doing so is the only way to reach the essence of the Modern Age. Heidegger highlights the importance of modern science as a

1 For instance, in the first volume of lectures on Nietzsche, he explicitly states how the entire history of Western philosophy is interpreted as Platonism. He emphasizes that Plato's philosophy is relevant for understanding both post-Platonic and pre-Platonic philosophies. He portrays Nietzsche's philosophy as a reversal of Platonism, asserting that the fundamental stance of metaphysics is determined by Platonism. He argues that the old establishment of values is Platonic-Christian valorisation. Additionally, he highlights how Plato's and Aristotle's definitions of truth permeate Western thought. He contends that Plato gave classical form to the doctrine of two worlds and that Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is essentially a critique of a degenerated form of Platonism. Moreover, he claims that Nietzsche's interpretation of the mind is also a form of Platonism. Similar references to Plato and Platonism can be found abundantly throughout his discussions.

pivotal element through which one can arrive at the metaphysical foundations of the Modern Age. Furthermore, amid the multitude of peculiarities of modern science, Heidegger isolates the notion of *exactness*. In the Medieval Age, science was considered as *doctrina scientia*, and even in earlier times, ancient Greek science was far from resembling the precision that exact science embodies. This precision characteristic of modern science leads to the core essence of modern science, which is characterized by the rigor of inquiry, akin to the strictness seen in mathematics. Therefore, as *Seiende* became the subject of scientific inquiry, it first led to the mathematization of *Seiende*, resulting in the subordination of nature to mathematical regularities – the quantities of motion in space and time according to measurements using numbers and calculation. Nevertheless, not all fields of study have adhered to the requisites of modernity. Many of the spiritual sciences have remained marginalized due to their inability to meet the strict standards of inquiry; they fall short of the demanded exactness as their *Seiende* resists measurement. Heidegger emphasizes the necessity for those sciences dealing with life to retain their *non-exact* nature in order to be genuinely rigorous, given that conforming to the precision of exact sciences is a far more challenging task than embracing the stringent demands imposed by the Modern Age. This insistence on nature to mathematical measurement has given rise to specific laws and rules, culminating in the development of a different form of *experimentation* from what existed in the Middle Ages with thinkers like Bacon (Cf. Bacon 2017: 2) or going even further back Aristotle's *ἐμπείρια* (Aristotle 1998: 4/980b). And, the science of the new age not only encompasses the natural sciences entirely, seeking to encompass the humanities, but it ultimately attempts to achieve the same with historical sciences. So, some sciences were the first to succumb to the new demands of the new age, measuring the being they investigated, while other sciences manage to resist mathematization and imposed certainty, and yet some sciences are marginalized because the being they study is neither measurable nor certain, etc. On this trajectory, Heidegger observes that, in addition to exactness and experimentation, the third distinctive trait of Modern Age science is *exploitation*. This element serves as the means by which modern science fully asserts its essence. Consequently, Heidegger remarks: “Hence, the determined expansion of the exploitation of modern science generates a new kind of people. The scientist vanishes, replaced by the researcher engaged in research enterprises. Moreover, they are constantly on the move, discussing scientific problems at symposia, acquiring information at congresses, establishing agreements with publishers. Publishers decide which books will be written” (Heidegger 1977a: 85).

What is significant to mention is that Heidegger observes how researchers become real only as technicians of institutions, while erudition and universities

are fading away in places where they have still managed to resist the times. Universities have turned into mere technical organizations of institutes and faculties, working on exploitation, organizing specializations, and announcing competitions for tasks that have come into the limelight. In his inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg, titled *What Is Metaphysics?*, from 1929, Heidegger writes about the fragmentation of sciences into various disciplines. Only the technical structure of universities and faculties still gathers and holds them together. Their roots in philosophy have long been forgotten. Moreover, it is not just a matter of science forgetting its origins in philosophy but also that the sciences do not notice that they relate to *Seiende* without posing questions about *Sein*. Heidegger explains this in the aforementioned inaugural lecture from 1929 in the following way: "This extraordinary attitude towards *Seiende* itself is carried and guided by a freely chosen stance of human existence" (Heidegger 1976b: 104). This wouldn't be subject to discussion if the sciences weren't put in the position that explicitly and solely they have the right to have the final word on *Seiende*. On the other hand, humans, as one of the *Seiende*, 'engage in science' by delving into the totality of *Seiende*. Or: "Just as the modern human being decides about the content of the world as an picture and its arrangement, they also decide about their own position in it; they position themselves, take a stance, in a way no previous type of human being ever did" (Inwood 2011: 61). Thus, all those researchers who are obedient to the modern goal of exploitation conform to the imposed demands, work more for the common good, and thus have higher prestige. The most esteemed among researchers have come to understand that exploitation, precision, method, and projects leading to compliance with the expectations of institutions as companies where such researchers are employed are the most crucial factors in modern science. The more and better they exploit, the more esteemed and better paid they are. They can even carry out their private projects outside of the institutions and faculties because no competition has yet been announced for them. One simply must be ready to adapt to all of this or to retreat into what is non-historical.

In the lecture from 1938 titled *The Age of the World Picture* (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*), Heidegger finds the reasons for this particular modern science, as he has in his earlier lectures, primarily in Descartes' metaphysics: "Science as research appears only when and if truth is transformed into the certainty of existence. For the first time, *Seiende* is determined as the objectness of representation, and truth as the certainty of representation in Descartes' metaphysics" (Heidegger 1977a: 87). This is the very reason why, besides the ancient and medieval worldviews, we now have the modern worldview. Changes in metaphysics paved the way for these shifts! This is where the essence of modern science comes into question, particularly its metaphysical

foundation. In the Annexes to this Lecture, Heidegger notes: “The essential changes in Descartes’ fundamental attitude that have occurred since Leibniz in German thought by no means overcome this fundamental attitude. They merely develop its entire metaphysical breadth and create the conditions for the 19th century, the darkest of all previous centuries” (Ibid.: 99). Heidegger uses the term *world picture* to point to a deeper meaning within the phrase: “Where the world becomes a picture, Seiende as a whole is taken as something human beings navigate by, so they want to represent it to themselves appropriately, to have it before them, and thus to clearly present it to themselves. The world picture, essentially understood, does not mean a picture of the world but the world understood as a picture” (Ibid.: 89). Therefore, it is not about a picture of the world; it is about the world becoming an image. This essentially signifies the essence of the Modern Age, as the Seiende in the Middle Ages was exposed as *ens creatum*, while in ancient times, it is what is λέγειν. So, the medieval doctrine of Seiende as created by god and the ancient doctrine of Seiende as discernment have been replaced by the modern concept of Seiende as representation: *repraesentatio*. Descartes’ metaphysics is what underpins this change because representation indicates that it is about pre-sentation as putting something (is) before in relation to something, where that something is the subject as the bearer of *cogito*. By linking ‘cogito’ and the ‘world picture’ in the lecture titled *The Essence of Truth (Vom Wesen des Grundes)* given in 1930 in Bremen, Marburg, Frankfurt, and then in 1932 in Dresden, Heidegger notes: “(...) Humanity completes its ‘world’ based on the latest needs and goals and fulfils it with its intentions and plans. Then, from these intentions and plans, humans – forgetting Seiende as a whole – take their measures. They stick to these measures and constantly supply themselves with new measures without considering the foundation of taking measures or the essence of what is being measured” (Heidegger 1976c: 195). To clarify this picture of the world, Heidegger adds the following in the lecture from 1938 titled *The Age of the World Picture (Die Zeit des Weltbildes)*: “It is one and the same process: the world becomes an image, and humans amidst Seiende become subjectum” (Heidegger 1977a: 92). In this manner, Heidegger highlights the crucial nature of two processes in shaping the Modern Age: firstly, the transformation of human beinghuman being into a *subjectum*, and secondly, the transformation of the world into an picture. This leads to a struggle over perspectives on the world, marked by uncertainty about who has greater power in calculation, planning, and control. This culminates in the apex of the Modern Age, indicating the beginning of what could be the longest period in the history of the Modern Age.

What characterizes this upcoming period of the Modern Age is a vastness that can be interpretively subsumed under one word: *Americanism*. It is something essentially European, representing a peculiarly unbridled vastness that

is not derived from the metaphysical essence of the new era itself and is not grounded in the demands of the Modern-Age metaphysics. Finally, following this line of thought, Heidegger concludes in the 1938 lecture: "However, what is denied to man, he will not be able to experience or reflect upon as long as he is engaged in mere prophecy of his epoch. Escape into tradition, a mixture of humility and arrogance, can bring nothing in itself except that human eyes remain closed and blind to the historical moment" (Ibid.: 96).

Question of the Essence of Action in the Modern Age

And not only did Heidegger pose the question of the essence of Modern Age science, but he also sought to address the problems of the epoch, which he attempted to elucidate in a letter written to Jean Beaufret in 1946, titled *On Humanism* (Brief über den Humanismus) and which begins with the statement: "We still by no means think decisively enough about the essence of action" (Heidegger 1976d: 313) – which hints at the determination to contemplate the essence of action. Consequently, Heidegger explains that the essence of action is an execution that signifies the development of something to its full essence, what it truly is, and, above all, Sein.

However, since the Sein is always the Sein of a Seiende, Heidegger, in the aforementioned letter, points out that what results from the relationship of Sein towards human being simply takes place in thought. This is because Sein comes into speech and reveals itself in the works of various thinkers throughout the history of thought, which is a guide to understanding that language is the house of Sein in which human beings dwell as those who think and sing. In the course of the first question of action and the subsequent question of thought, it becomes evident that thinking acts by thinking itself, so that every action is based on Sein, thus emerging precisely into Seiende. Therefore, Heidegger states: "Thinking is l'engagement in truth and for the truth of Sein. Its history has never passed, it is always yet to come. The history of Sein carries and determines every *conditio et situatio humanae*" (Ibid.: 314). Consequently, it is not surprising that Heidegger suggests that we should once and for all discard the technical interpretation of thought constructed in Western "logic" and "grammar" as something that reaches its peak in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Or, in Heidegger's own words: "Philosophy is haunted by the fear that it loses its reputation and significance if it is not science. This is considered a deficiency equated with unscientificity. Sein, as an element of thought, has been abandoned in the technical exposition of thought. 'Logic' sanctions this exposition, which starts with the sophists and Plato" (Ibid.: 315). It is essential to emphasize that, despite the impression given by the statement, it doesn't advocate irrationalism but rather points to the problem of

thought that characterizes what is called Western thought and is constructed in the science of thought as logic and the science of language as grammar through which this thought is expressed, and even before that, thought itself.

Through the *conditio et situatio humanae*, the question of *humanism* is raised. When the question of humanism is posed, we immediately know that there has been a kind of long-standing contempt or at least suspicion toward every *-ism*. This is why such a question becomes controversial from the very beginning, inviting a certain critique or thoughtful examination. If we look back to the Greeks, we can see that they did not think in terms of what we nowadays call, for instance, ethics, politics, aesthetics, physics, and, indeed, they didn't even have a concept for what we today consider philosophy. Today, we view everything through the lens of "metaphysics", which essentially means interpreting the Sein from a certain metaphysical standpoint. Heidegger states this explicitly: "Philosophy gradually becomes a technique for elucidating the highest causes. It no longer thinks, but is concerned with 'philosophy'. In the competition of such endeavours, they then present themselves publicly as ... 'ism' and attempt to surpass each other. The authority of such titles is not accidental. This authority, especially in Modern Age, rests on a kind of dictatorship of the public" (Ibid.: 317). Following this, Heidegger finds that the endangerment of the essence of speech arises from the endangerment essence of human being because the devastation of "speech" and its decline or attachment to logic and unquestioning adherence are not the reasons but rather the results of Modern Age metaphysics.

And in line with all this, we should ask the question that has been raised: What does it mean for a human being (*homo*) to become human (*humanus*)? Typically, humanism is understood as an effort for a man to become humane, in contrast to the effort for a man to be inhumane as *inhuman*. This notion was explicitly considered during the Roman Republic as *homo humanus versus homo barbarus*, indicating that humanism is indeed a Roman phenomenon revived during the Renaissance. In this context, the Renaissance human being is portrayed as *homo humanus*, while the Medieval scholastic human being is portrayed as *homo barbarus* (See more: Celenza 2000). Following these premises, it is not surprising that Heidegger's statement in the 1946 letter reads: "Hölderlin, on the other hand, does not belong to 'humanism' because he thinks the destiny of the essence of human being more originally than 'humanism' could" (Heidegger 1976d: 320). This means that *humanitas* is always in relation to something, that *humanitas* arises from some metaphysics, or that *humanitas* itself establishes a metaphysics, all while avoiding the question of the relationship between human being and Sein and focusing on the question of human being and Sein. The first Roman humanism assumes the essence of human being as something self-explanatory, just like the metaphysics that

asks about Sein, inquiring about the Seiende while overlooking the difference between Sein and Seiende, and even that Seiende which we call human being through humanism is reduced to just one Seiende among plants, animals, and deities. This actually underestimates the true dignity of human being. In light of all this, Heidegger argues that the highest characteristics of human being promoted by humanism do not explore the true dignity of human being. Humanism does not advocate inhumanity or the non-human, but it is critiqued here because it does not provide a high enough place for human being, which genuinely belongs to him. Heidegger asserts this based on the thesis that the advent of Seiende rests in the destiny of Sein, and therefore, because human being is the shepherd of Sein, which was meant when care was delivered as the Sein of Dasein in his principal work, concerning the investigation of the real existence of non-existence.

Heidegger repeats words from his main work from 1927 titled *Being and Time* (Sein und Zeit), with an added clarification: “‘Only as long as Dasein is there, is there Sein?’ Certainly. This means: only as long as the purity of Sein happens, Sein is entrusted to human being. But the fact that the ‘Da’ of purity as the truth of Sein itself occurs is the destiny of Sein itself” (Ibid.: 336). Heidegger explains how he sought to discern the proximity of that Sein more explicitly through Hölderlin’s poetry, especially through his concept of Homeland, which is conceived within the horizon of the history of Sein and by no means patriotically or nationalistically. It was not about speaking of what he called the German in a way that others should recover from, but rather as something through which Germans have to define themselves if they want to become world-historical alongside others. Simply put, the indifferent Modern Age homelandlessness compelled Hölderlin to set the task for his compatriots to finally find their essence in the destiny of the West. Heidegger elucidates such matters in his lecture from 1935/1936 titled *The Origin of the Artwork* (Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes), where he records: “During World War I, Hölderlin’s Hymns were packed into a soldier’s backpack along with cleaning supplies” (Heidegger 1977b: 3). He adds: “The truly poetic project is the opening of that into which Dasein as historical Da-sein has already been thrown. It is the land, and for a historical people, its homeland is a self-closing foundation on which it rests, along with everything that it still keeps hidden from itself” (Ibid.: 63). Following this, Heidegger adds in the letter on humanism: “However, the West is not thought of regionally as the Occident in contrast to the Orient, not simply as Europe but as world-historical from the proximity of its inception” (Heidegger 1976d: 338). Because the homeland is what is delivered as the proximity of Sein, while homelessness is the abandonment of being by being, he adds: “Homelessness becomes a world destiny” (Ibid.: 339). Therefore, it is not surprising that Heidegger argues: “The danger into

which the Europe of today is increasingly falling probably consists in the fact that, above all, its thought – once its greatness – essentially lags behind the approaching fate of the world, and this destiny, nevertheless, in its basic traits, remains European” (Ibid.: 341). Against this homelessness that becomes a world destiny, it would be necessary to oppose the destiny of human being, who finds himself in what is the truth of Sein, after being called by Sein to be the shepherd of Sein, following the task found in the definition of human being as *animal rationale*. Heidegger also mentions something similar in 1939 in a text titled *On the Essence and Concept of φύσις in Aristotle's Physics B1* (Vom Wesen und Begriff der PHYSIS. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1), stating: “Metaphysics is the knowledge in which Western historical mankind preserves the truth of its relations to Seiende as a whole and the truth about Seiende itself” (Heidegger 1976e: 241). He adds: “However, if we take into account that this basic word of Western metaphysics contains decisions about the truth of Seiende, if we remember that today the truth of Seiende as a whole has become thoroughly doubtful, or rather that the essence of the truth is entirely doubtful, and finally, if we know that all of this is based on the history of interpreting the essence of φύσις, we then find ourselves outside the historical interests that philosophy can have in the ‘history of the concept’. We then, albeit from afar, redeem the proximity of future decisions” (Ibid.: 241–242). Heidegger poses the question whether this is precisely what *humanitas*, the *homo humanus* who thinks more fittingly about human being, is – that is, the human being as human being from the proximity of Sein. Heidegger calls this ek-sistence, the standing in the clear of Sein, which implies what a human being is, what the essence of a human being is spoken of in the language of the metaphysical tradition, what the substance of a human being is. Or, in Heidegger’s words: “The way in which human being, through his own essence, is present in the Sein is ecstatic standing in the truth of Sein” (Heidegger 1976d: 330). Following this, and for humanism to truly become humanism, Heidegger calls for remaining at least in the vicinity of Sein in the days to come while we are still travellers on the path. In this way, there is a possibility for humanism to become true humanity, as the previous term ‘humanism’ has lost its meaning. In his 1943 lecture titled *Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead'* (Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’), Heidegger notes: “We do not know what possibilities the fate of Western history holds for our people and for the West. The external shaping and structuring of these possibilities is not the most important. What matters is that we, as we learn to think and at the same time teach others to think, stay on the path and are there at the right moment” (Heidegger 1977c: 212). For Heidegger stand on the path means to recognize that the demand for a question about humanism insists on seeking a more original meaning of the word ‘humanism’, while at the same time answering how we oppose the previous

determination of humanism by questioning the need for that concept without being forced into opposing humanism and advocating something inhuman (See: Rockmore 1995: 73). In other words, speaking against humanism does not mean speaking in favour of inhumanism, irrationalism, or deviance, but simply speaking against humanism as the determining factor in today's world.

Along these lines, we can address the last question about how philosophy could become adventurous in this way. Heidegger responds to this question: "It is time to unburden ourselves from overestimating philosophy and expecting too much from it. In the current need of the world, it is necessary: less philosophy, but more care in thinking; less literature, but more nurturing of words. Future thinking is no longer philosophy that thinks more primordially than metaphysics, which the name itself signifies" (Heidegger 1976d: 334). So, the question of the essence action has actually become a question of *humanism*, derived from the question of human being, and human being from the question of Seiende, and Seiende from the question of Sein – the forgetting of Sein, and even the forgetting of ontological difference, simply led to the problem of Sein, which ultimately resulted in the problems of Seiende as human being and, consequently, the problem of the essence of action. Because, according to Heidegger, every action is based on Sein, thus emerging precisely into Seiende. And, in the wake of all that has been mentioned, the essence of the modern-age action becomes apparent.

Question of the Essence of Technic in the Modern Age

Answering the questions of today, one of the issues that had been raised was the question of technic, which Heidegger spoke about in 1953 at the Auditorium Maximum of the University of Munich, upon the invitation of the Director of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. This lecture was titled *The Question Concerning Technic* (Die Frage nach der Technik). In the first sentence of this lecture, Heidegger repeats the title, stating that he will be addressing the question of technic, thereby paving the path of thought that leads through language – just as all paths of thought do.

Right at the beginning, in the second paragraph, Heidegger points out the distinction between technic, the essence of technic, and the technical. He claims that the essence of technic is not something technical. These distinctions and the question of technic itself are crucial because we are essentially bound to technic. According to the ancient teaching, the essence represents what something is. Heidegger, in a lecture from 1946 titled *What Are Poets For?* (Wozu Dichter?), noted: "(...) Technic itself prevents every experience of the essence of technic. Indeed, technic, when it fully unfolds, develops into a kind of knowing that refuses to concern itself with the essence of technic, let

alone reflect on the origin of its essence” (Ibid.: 295). However, in the 1953 lecture titled *The Question Concerning Technic* (Die Frage nach der Technik), Heidegger attempts to elucidate this claim by seeking the essence of technic. He suggests that technic is a means to an end, just like actions, regardless of whether some argue for one or the other. As such, it is an *instrumentum*. Nevertheless, while trying to distinguish between the concepts we use concerning the posed question, it does not reveal the essence of technic itself – what it truly is. This requires questions about its essence, purpose, function, and the relationships between means and ends (See: Dreyfus 1997: 41–54).

Inquiring into the essence of technic, Heidegger observes how both purpose and deed, as well as means and instrument, have a cause. Following this, he notes that philosophy has been teaching about four kinds of causes for centuries: *causa materialis*, *causa formalis*, *causa finalis*, *causa efficient* (Heidegger 2000a: 9). However, the question is why there are (only) four causes and what the cause itself actually means, because if one does not embark on the path of thinking, the question of technic will remain dark and indeterminate: The four kinds of causes established by Aristotle hold significance in matters of blame, debt, effect, achievement, outcome, or the falling of something. However, Heidegger questions all of this in the context of technic, and, in doing so, he wonders what the Greek word ‘*techne*’ itself truly means. Heidegger asserts: “The decisive τέχνη does not reside, therefore, in making and constructing, in the use of means, but in the naming revealing. As a revealing, not a making, *techne* is production (...). Technic is a way of revealing. Technic exists in the domain where the revealing and unconcealment occur, in ἀληθεια, truth” (Ibid.: 15). In line with this, it is worth noting Heidegger’s words from 1946 in his letter on humanism (Über den Humanismus): “The essence of materialism hides in the essence of technic, which, even though much has been written about it, is little understood. The essence of technic is a history-shaping destiny of the truth of Sein, which lies in oblivion. It does not merely return by name to the τέχνη of the Greeks, but essentially originates from τέχνη as a way of ἀληθεια, that is, the revealing of Seiende. As one form of truth, technology is grounded in the history of metaphysics. It is an extraordinary and so far the only comprehensible phase in the history of Sein” (Heidegger 1976d: 340). Due to the nature of technic as a revealing, it is not surprising that Modern Age technic employs precise natural science, which often carries the character of exploitation. This is because Modern Age technic as revealing is placed in the service of exploitation: hidden energy is released, then transformed, after which the liberated energy is accumulated for distribution and transmission. All of this is part of the mode of revealing exploitation. Heidegger, in 1943, in a lecture titled *Nietzsche’s Words ‘God is Dead’* (Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’), noted: “(...) for decades people have

been accustomed to attributing the rule of technic or the revolt of the masses as causes of the historical state of the era, and they relentlessly dissect the spiritual situation of the time in line with such aspects" (Heidegger 1977c: 221–222). In light of this, Heidegger elucidates the idea of revealing as exploitation with an extensive example: "The forester who measures the felled tree in the forest and, in all likelihood, tours the forest using the same paths as his grandfather did is today appointed by the timber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is appointed to serve the availability of cellulose, itself induced by the need for paper provided to periodicals and illustrated magazines. These periodicals impose on public opinion that they 'digest' this so they may become amenable to its prescribed guidance" (Heidegger 2000a: 18–19). It is not surprising, in this context, that Heidegger noted in a 1946 lecture titled *What Are Poets For?* (Wozu Dichter?): "A self-fulfilled person is a functionary of technic, whether as an individual they know and desire it or not" (Heidegger 1977d: 293–294).

Simply put, a person in the technic age is one who is prompted by modern technic to discover primarily what is contained in nature through 'storing', whether it be copper ore, uranium, or oil, and most importantly, the discovery of basic energy 'stores' that, with the advent of exact sciences, portray nature as a kind of system of forces, all calculable through mathematics. This aligns with Heidegger's words from 1946 in a lecture titled *What Are Poets For?* (Wozu Dichter?): "The Earth and its atmosphere become raw materials. Human being becomes human material determined for assumed goals. The unconditional establishment of unconditional self-fulfilment of deliberate exposure (production) of the world in a state of human order is a process arising from the hidden essence of technic" (Ibid.: 289). Amidst all this, what constitutes the essence of technic remains concealed behind the multitude of electrical machines and atomic technic. Heidegger justifies this by stating that everything that comes earlier becomes known to us later, and everything that is essential remains hidden the longest. Thus, when questioning Modern Age technic, Heidegger is essentially inquiring about the essence of technic. In this context, he uses the term *Ge-stell* to elucidate the sought essence of technic, defining it as a concept whose usual meaning is a frame, a base, a skeleton: "Ge-stell is the gathering placement that sets human being to stand within the revealing as the revealing. As so provoked, humanity stands within the domain of the essence of Ge-stell" (Heidegger 2000a: 24–25). This implies that the essence of Modern Age technic is rooted in 'Ge-stell' whose dominion belongs to the destiny of human disclosure, making it vulnerable. Heidegger cites an assertion by Heisenberg: "But man doesn't encounter himself today anywhere in truth – that is, in his own essence" (Heisenberg 1954: 60 and more). Therefore, Heidegger arrives at the following insight: "What is dangerous is not technic. There is no demonry of technic; instead, there is the

mystery of its essence. The essence of technic is like the destiny of revealing – danger. The altered meaning of the word ‘Ge-stell’ now becomes somewhat more intimate to us when we think of ‘Ge-stell’ in terms of destiny and danger. The endangerment of human being does not merely come from potentially lethal machines and technical apparatus. The real endangerment of human being lies already in its essence” (Heidegger 2000a: 29). Since the question of human being essence has been initiated, Heidegger invokes Hölderlin’s verses where it is noted that where there is danger, there must also be the saving, prompting Heidegger to once again pose the question of the essence of technic to find the saving within the dangerous, as sung by Hölderlin in his poetry. Heidegger arrives at the following insight: “Precisely in the Ge-stell that threatens to divert human being into framing as supposedly the only way of revealing and thus pushes him into the peril of sacrificing his free essence, it is precisely in that extreme danger that the closest, indestructible belonging of human being to what is coming to pass, provided that we have fallen to his part, is most evident and approaches us most, where we least expect it, that is, in the realm of modern technic, a modern technic that is entirely alien to antiquity but nevertheless essentially originates from it” (Ibid.: 33). In essence, Heidegger affirms Hölderlin’s words, showing that what was initially presumed as a danger actually conceals the growth of what is salvational and indicates the ambiguity of the essence of technic, which is not something technical. In a lecture from 1953 titled *Science and Reflection* (Wissenschaft und Besinnung), Heidegger notes: “What was thought in early Greek antiquity or what was spoken in poetic form is still present today, so present that its essence, unworthy of itself, everywhere greets us and approaches us most where we least expect it: in the dominion of modern technology, a modern technic that is entirely alien to antiquity but nevertheless essentially originates from it” (Heidegger 2000b: 41).

Closing Speech

After everything presented, we can perceive the fulfilment of the intention to gather the multitude of fragments from various works of Heidegger’s Secondary literature on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age in one place to prove the hypothesis regarding the foundation of Heidegger’s teachings on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age. Such a hypothesis is proven threefold—firstly, through posing Questions about the Essence of Modern Age Science, then through Questioning the Essence of Action in the Modern Age, and finally, through Questioning the Essence of Technic in the Modern Age. The selection of these three questions posed by Heidegger in his works of Secondary literature — a separate library unit where each question is

addressed does not imply the closure of the theme but rather the perpetuation of reflections on the posed question through various fragments in different periods of thought. Indeed, these questions are highlighted as the three fundamental questions based on which we can prove the hypothesis regarding the foundation of Heidegger's teachings on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age. Following this path, this essay has explored the main phenomena of Modern Age emphasized by Heidegger in his Secondary literature to demonstrate the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age and thus prove the Metaphysical Foundation of the Modern Age's essence of Modern Age science, the essence of action in the Modern Age, and the essence of technic in the Modern Age. For Heidegger, many phenomena of the Modern Age that define the Modern Age, distinguishing it from the Middle Ages or the age yet to come, are primarily Modern Age science. Another phenomenon Heidegger considers Modern Age is the totality of human being action with the interpretation of that action as culture. Furthermore, as another modern phenomenon that shapes the Modern Age as it is, Heidegger mentions machine technic as a visible outcome of the technic of the Modern Age. Certainly, Heidegger in his works mentions other phenomena of the Modern Age — such as, for example, the entry of art into aesthetics in a way that the artistic work in the Modern Age is considered an object of experience, and even secularization — but, in the context of his opus, the first three phenomena of the Modern Age are thoroughly problematized in at least one library unit. The separation of these mentioned phenomena of the Modern Age aimed to gather different fragments from Heidegger's lectures in one place to prove the hypothesis about the foundation of Heidegger's teachings on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age. Following this path, this essay has explored the main phenomena of modernity emphasized by Heidegger in his Secondary works to demonstrate the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age and thus prove the Metaphysical Foundation of the Modern Age's essence of Modern Age science, the essence of action in the Modern Age, and the essence of technic in the Modern Age. Ultimately, the certainty of the research results can be proven by Heidegger's own words from the lecture titled *The Age of the World Picture* (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*) given in 1938, with the remark: "Metaphysics establishes an epoch by providing a specific interpretation of *Seiende* and a particular understanding of truth as the foundation of the epoch in its essential form. This foundation permeates all manifestations characterizing the epoch" (Heidegger 1977d: 75).

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